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Abstract
This chapter focuses on the initial public offerings (IPO) ETFs, which constitute an
alternative way to enter the IPO business. Short- and long-term performance of ETFs
is examined vis-a-vis the performance of major market indices. Three types of returns
are computed; the absolute, benchmark-adjusted, and abnormal return. Returns are
computed for the initial trading day and for the first 2, 3, 4, 5, 21, and 63 trading days.
Long-run returns are also calculated for the first 6, 12, 18, and 24 months of trading
and for the entire history of ETFs up to October 31, 2016 from a cumulative and a buy-
and-hold perspective. Risk-adjusted returns are estimated with a six-factor model.
The results indicate that the average first-day return is positive but below 1%. In the
long run, the cumulative absolute returns are positive during the several intervals
examined, whereas the cumulative benchmark-adjusted and abnormal returns are
positive only for the first 6 months of trading. These returns become negative after the
first 6 months. Going further, ETFs deliver significant buy-and-hold returns over the
several periods examined. Finally, the results reveal that just one out of the four IPO
ETFs examined can produce a robust and statistically significant alpha.
Keywords: initial public offerings, Exchange Traded Funds, performance,
risk-adjusted returns
1. Introduction
Initial public offerings (IPOs) business has diachronically been of great interest
to the investing community worldwide as investors deem IPOs as a great opportu-
nity for significant short-term and possibly long-term gains. In addition, tens of
tens of academic articles have been written on this field. The main finding of the
literature is that IPOs are usually underpriced as depicted in their initial returns,
which are significantly positive, either in absolute terms or when compared to
corresponding non-IPO stocks or relevant market indices. Underpricing refers to
the significantly low offer price of IPOs relative to the close price of stocks on their
first trading day. On the contrary, when long-run returns are assessed, the academic
research has shown that IPOs tend to underperform their reference portfolios.
This chapter focuses on IPO Exchange Traded Funds (IPO ETFs), which consti-
tute an alternative vehicle for investors to enter the IPO business. An IPO ETF is an
exchange traded fund that focuses on stocks of companies that have recently held an
initial public offering. IPO ETFs are appealing to investors because they provide them
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with an inexpensive and flexible tool to invest in a large pool of initial public offer-
ings. On the contrary, investing in such a large number of IPOs individually would
not be practically feasible due to the high cost of such a strategy. In addition, IPO
ETFs enable robust diversification strategies against the highly volatile IPO market.
The origins of IPO ETFs go back to April 2006, when the First Trust US Equity
Opportunities ETF was launched on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). The
Renaissance IPO ETF came to the surface about 7 years later in October 2013. The
Renaissance International IPO ETF followed 1 year later. The last entry in the IPO
ETF market was the First Trust International IPO ETF. This fund began trading in
November 2014.
In this chapter, we examine the short- and the long-term performance of IPO
ETFs. In particular, we compute the absolute, benchmark-adjusted, and abnormal
returns of ETFs. Abnormal returns are obtained with the usage of the market model
successively against the S&P 500 Index and the S&P 600 Small Cap Index. These
indices also serve as benchmarks when we calculate the benchmark-adjusted
returns of ETFs. Moreover, in the short-run, returns are computed for the first
trading day as well as for the first 2, 3, 4, 5, 21, and 63 trading days. At the long run,
cumulative absolute, benchmark-adjusted, and abnormal returns are calculated
over the first 6, 12, 18, and 24 months of trading and for the entire trading history of
each ETF up to October 31, 2016. Respective buy-and-hold returns are computed
too. Furthermore, risk-adjusted returns are estimated with the usage of a six-factor
model, which follows the Fama and French multivariate model. Finally, a market
trend analysis is performed. This analysis assesses the pricing behavior of IPO ETFs
during the descending and the upward phases of the overall stock market.
The results show that IPO ETFs provide slightly positive average first-day returns
given that the average initial return is positive but well below 1%. Going further, the
average absolute return of IPO ETFs is positive over the first five trading days, but it
is negative over the first 21 and 63 days of trading. Benchmark-adjusted returns are
also positive up to 5 days when the S&P 500 Index is taken into consideration, but
they are rather negative when the S&P 600 Small Cap Index is assessed. Finally,
average abnormal returns are negative after the initial day of trading.
With respect to ETF long-term performance, results reveal positive cumulative
absolute returns over the various periods considered, whereas the cumulative
benchmark-adjusted and abnormal returns are positive only for the first 6 months
of trading with the majority of returns becoming negative over the next time
periods examined. In the case of buy-and-hold returns, results indicate that ETFs
produce significant such returns in the long run, either when the absolute or the
benchmark-adjusted returns are assessed. As far as risk-adjusted return is
concerned, the regression analysis shows that just one out of the four IPO ETFs
examined can produce robust and statistically significant excess return relative to
market performance.
In the last step, the market trend analysis reveals that when the stock market
goes down, the absolute return of IPO ETFs goes down too on about 76% of
negative trading days. When market goes up, IPO ETFs go up to in a rate of about
63% of positive trading days. The opposite behavior is displayed by the benchmark-
adjusted return of ETFs. This means that when the market goes down, the
benchmark-adjusted returns of ETFs moves upward in a rate of about 68% of days
and when market returns increase, the benchmark-adjusted performance of ETFs
declines in a rate of about 65% of days. A similar one to benchmark-adjusted
return’s behavior is the case for abnormal returns.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study on IPO ETFs. Given the
convenience of trading with ETFs, the low cost of investing in such products, the
high liquidity of the ETF market in general and the great interest of investors and
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researchers in IPOs, our study should be highly welcome by the investing commu-
nity and researchers. In addition, the positive initial returns and, even more impor-
tantly, the significant buy-and-hold returns revealed by our study should help
investors plot profitable trading strategies. Finally, the results of the market trend
performance analysis could also help investors implement strategies with mighty
potential of substantial gains.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Next section provides a
brief literature review on IPOs performance in the United States and other interna-
tional markets. Section 3 develops the methodology used in our empirical investi-
gation. Section 4 describes the data used in this study and provides information
about the trading features of the sample’s ETFs. The empirical findings of our
research are presented in Section 5 and the conclusions are discussed in Section 6.
2. Literature review
Given the lack of any research papers on IPO ETFs, we will provide a brief
review of the main findings of the literature concerning the short- and long-run
performance of IPOs worldwide.
A plethora of papers have examined the performance of IPOs using data from
the United States. In early years, several studies, such as [1–7], have accentuated
that IPOs are underpriced as can be inferred by the returns on their first trading
days, which are significantly positive. In the same concept, [8] estimate that during
1990–1998, US IPOs left over $27 billion of money on the table, where the money
left on the table is defined as the price gain of the first trading day times the number
of shares sold. The money left on the table is translated into significant underpricing
of IPOs during the nineties. Furthermore, [9] report that in the 1980s, the average
initial return on IPOs was 7%, whereas the average first-day IPO return doubled to
almost 15% during the period 1990–1998, before jumping to 65% during the inter-
net bubble years of 1999–2000. Finally, [10] shows that, after the bubble of 1999–
2000, the average initial return of IPOs in the US over the first decade of the new
century was moving around 10%.
The short-run performance of IPOs in other developed and emerging markets
has attracted the interest of researchers. Loughran et al. [11] show that the move by
most East Asian countries to reduce regulatory interference in the setting of offer-
ing prices resulted in less short-run underpricing in the 1990s than in the 1980s.
Ritter [10] shows that in China, the second largest economy of the world,
underpricing of IPOs has been severe with initial returns amounting to up to 200%.
However, over the recent years, IPO underpricing in China has started to decline as
a result of the changing institutional constraints. The great underpricing of Chinese
IPOs is also supported by the findings of [12, 13]. In Australia, Lee et al. [14] report
strong first-day returns. Significant underpricing of IPOs is reported for Canada by
[15] IPOs are underpriced in Japan too as evidenced by [16]. In the UK, Levis [17]
has documented a significant underpricing of the companies going public in the
British stock market. The same pattern has been revealed by [18] for Italy and [19]
for France. More or less, IPO underpricing is a global phenomenon. To testify this
assertion, Loughran et al. [20] report comprehensive statistical evidence of strong
first-day IPO returns for a sample of 52 developed and emerging capital markets,
which range from 3.3% in Russia to 239.8% in Saudi Arabia.
When it comes to the long-run performance of IPOs in the United States, the main
conclusion of the literature is that that the stocks of companies going public tend to be
overpriced in the long run. Overpricing is depicted in the underperformance of IPOs
versus similar non-IPO stocks or relevant market indices. In this respect, Ibbotson
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[21] provides evidence that the initial returns and the long-run performance of IPOs
were negatively related during the period 1960–1969. Ritter [7] finds that IPO stocks
significantly underperform a set of comparable companies over the 3 years after
going public. Rajan and Servaes [22] reveal that over a 5-year period after going
public, companies’ underperformance relative to the market benchmarks ranges
from 17% to 47.1%. Carter et al. [23] estimate an average underperformance of US
IPOs over a three-year period after the initial offering of 19.92%. Gompers and Lerner
[24] examine the performance for up to 5 years after listing of nearly 3661 IPOs in the
US during the period 1935–1972 and find some evidence of underperformance when
event time buy-and-hold abnormal returns are used but underperformance disap-
pears when cumulative abnormal returns are utilized.
Outside the United Sates, in Australia, How et al. [25] compare the long-run
performance of companies going public that payed a dividend and similarly matched
firms, which did not pay a dividend revealing strong evidence that the paying firms
perform significantly better than the nonpaying firms for a period up to 5 years after
the dividend initiation date. Moshirian et al. [26] indicate that in China, Hong Kong,
Japan, Korea, Malaysia, and Singapore, whilst there is initial underpricing in Asian
IPOs, the existence of long-run underperformance depends on the methodology used.
In Japan, Kirkulak [27] reports a three-year underperformance of 18.3% for the
stocks listed between 1998 and 2001. In Canada, Kooli and Suret [28] find that
investors who buy stocks immediately after their listing and hold these shares for a
period of 3 years will incur a loss of about 20%. When a five-year buy-and-hold
strategy is considered, underperformance amounts to 26.5%. In the United King-
dom, a number of studies such as those of [17, 29–31] have documented the existence
of IPOs’ long-run overpricing. Other studies on European IPOs, such as those of [32–
34] for Germany, [35] for Austria, [36] for Spain, [18] for Italy, and [37] for France,
also reveal significant long-run overpricing of IPOs. Overpricing is evidenced by their
poor long-term performance compared to the performance of relevant market indices
or reference stock portfolios. Based on these findings, IPOs would not be suitable for
long-term buy-and-hold trading strategies.
3. Methodology
3.1 Short-term return analysis
In this section, we assess the short-term performance of IPO ETFs. In this
respect, we compute the first day or initial return of ETFs. The first-day return does
not necessarily refer to the return on the launch day of ETFs but refers to the return
on the first trading day with no-zero volume because an ETF may have started
actual trading on the days that followed its listing on the stock exchange.
Three alternative types of initial returns are computed. The first one refers to the
absolute return of ETFs, which, based on [38], is defined as the gain or the loss on a
portfolio achieved over a certain period without being compared to a reference
portfolio or another benchmark. First-day absolute return is computed in percent-
age terms using the following formula:
ð1Þ
where IARi,t = 1 refers to the percentage absolute return of the ith ETF on its first
trading day, CTPi,t = 1 refers to the close trade price of the ETF on its first trading
day and OPENi,t = 1 refers to the open trade price of this ETF on the same day.
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The second type of initial return computed is the benchmark-adjusted return of
ETFs, which, following [7], is computed as the difference between the initial abso-
lute return of the ith ETF and the corresponding return of the benchmark. The first-
day benchmark-adjusted return of ETFs is shown in the following formula:
BAIRi,t¼1 ¼ IRi,t¼1–BRt¼1 (2)
where BAIRi,t = 1 refers to percentage benchmark-adjusted return of the ith ETF
on its first trading day, IRi,t = 1 is defined as above and BRt = 1 concerns the return of
the market index on ETF’s first trading day.
In our estimations of benchmark-adjusted returns, we employ two alternative
stock indices to serve as benchmarks. The first one is the S&P 500 Index, which
consists of the 500 largest companies in terms of market capitalization listed on the
NYSE or NASDAQ. The second benchmark used is the S&P 600 Small Cap Index,
which covers the small-cap range of US stocks. According to [39], indices that
consist mostly of small cap companies are better benchmarks when assessing the
performance of smaller stocks or portfolios. The S&P 600 Small Cap Index is used
because the ETFs that have been selected to be studied are rather small-cap ETFs
and, consequently, a small-cap index may be a more appropriate benchmark.1
In order to calculate the return of the index, which will correspond to ETF’s first-
day return, we use formula (1) for indices too. This means that given that the
trading history of the selected benchmarks is much longer than the history of the
sample’s ETFs, we calculate the return of indices on ETF’s first trading day by
subtracting the open price of the index on the day which relates to ETF’s first
trading day from its close price on the same day and we divide by the open price.
The third type of initial return estimated is the abnormal return obtained with
the usage of the market model. In order to estimate abnormal returns of ETFs, we
follow the approach of [40]. More specifically, so as to estimate the abnormal
returns of ETFs, we first need to estimate the time series market model expressed in
Eq. (3), via which the return of ETFs is successively regressed on the return of the
selected market indices:
Ri ¼ αi þ βiRm þ εi (3)
where Ri stands for the daily return of the ith ETF, Rm represents the return of
the market index, namely the return of the S&P 500 Index or the S&P 600 Small
Cap Index. We estimate market model to obtain the alpha and beta coefficients of
each ETF, which we will then use to compute abnormal returns with the following
model:
1 As we will explain in a following section, each IPO ETF has its own benchmark and, thus, one could
wonder why we do not use each ETF’s own benchmark to estimate their benchmark-adjusted
performance. We do not do so, for two reasons. The first one is that the majority of ETFs worldwide and
IPO ETFs in particular are passively managed and, thus, the tracking error of these funds, that is the
difference in returns between ETFs and underlying indices, is expected to be low. (We will see in Table 1
that the tracking error of the sample’s ETFs is indeed low.) Therefore, a new ETF’s price will also
generally remain in line with the price of the underlying basket of securities and an “underpricing”
pattern like that observed in IPOs of ordinary stocks is not expected to be the case. The second reason is
that we try to identify whether IPO ETFs can be an alternative investing tool of investors seeking
returns, which will be better than the average market returns, with the market returns being usually
represented by indices such as the two used in our analysis.
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ð4Þ
where ARi,t = 1 is the abnormal return of the ith ETF on the first trading day,
computed as the difference between the actual absolute return of ETF and the
expected return based on the market model on the first trading day, α^i and β^i are the
parameters obtained from the market model. The estimation window of Eq. (4)
covers the entire trading history of each ETF up to October 31, 2016.
After calculating the three types of ETFs’ initial return, we then compute the
average short-term returns of longer periods. More specifically, we compute the
average daily returns of ETFs over the first 2, 3, 4, 5, 21 (i.e., 1 month), and 63 (i.e.,
3 months) of trading. Similarly to the initial returns, we first calculate the absolute
return of each ETF as follows:
ð5Þ
where ARi,t refers to percentage absolute return of the ith ETF on day t and CTPi,
t refers to the close trade price of the ETF on the same day. Afterward, we estimate
the benchmark-adjusted and abnormal returns of ETFs using the framework
described in formulas (2), (3) and (4) above.
3.2 Long-term return analysis
The long-run performance of IPO ETFs is assessed in this section. Two types of
long-run performance measures are employed in the analysis; cumulative average
returns and buy-and-hold returns. The cumulative average return is calculated as in
[41]. More specifically, we calculate the average daily return of each ETF for each
calendar month during its entire trading history excluding the launch month of ETF
and starting from the month that follows the initial trading of the fund. Following
[30], we do so to allow for the possibility of price support in the first few trading
days. The cumulative average return starting on the first trading day of the month
following the listing of the ith ETF and extending to T months after the listing is the
summation of the average returns in each month:
ð6Þ
where CARi refers to the cumulative average return of the ith ETF and AMRt is
the average daily return of the fund in month t.
We note that we calculate three alternative types of cumulative returns, which
are the cumulative absolute return, the cumulative benchmark-adjusted return and
the cumulative abnormal return following the framework described in the previous
section. Again, two benchmarks are used; the S&P 500 Index and the S&P 600
Small Cap Index. Moreover, we compute cumulative returns over the first 6 months
(i.e., 126 trading days), 12 months (i.e., 252 trading days), 18 months (i.e., 378
trading days), and 24 months (i.e., 504 trading days) of the trading history of each
ETF as well as over its entire trading history up to October 31, 2016.
In order to calculate the buy-and-hold return of ETFs, we assume that an inves-
tor buys ETF shares on their listing day and holds them up to a specific time
interval, which, in our case, ranges from 6 months to the entire trading history of
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each ETF (as above). The buy-and-hold return is estimated in percentage terms
using a formula similar to formula (5). The key difference between the two calcu-
lations concerns the estimation window. This means that, for instance, in the case of
the first 6-month period, buy-and-hold return is computed by considering the
percentage difference in the close trade prices of the ith ETF between the first and
the 126th trading day after the month of ETF’s listing on the stock exchange, in the
case of the 12-month period, buy-and-hold return is computed by considering the
percentage difference in the close trade price of the ith ETF between the first and
the 252nd trading day after the month of ETF’s listing, and so on. A last note is that,
similarly to cumulative returns, we estimate the buy-and-hold return in its absolute,
benchmark-adjusted and abnormal forms.
3.3 Risk-adjusted performance analysis
The risk-adjusted performance of IPO ETFs is evaluated in this section with the
usage of an augmented Fama and French model. This model is based on the model
developed by [42] to which the [43] Momentum factor, a Conservative Minus
Aggressive factor and a Robust Minus Weak factor have been added. The model is
shown in Eq. (7):
Ri  Rf ¼ αi þ β1,i Rm  Rf
 
þ β2,iSMBþ β3,iHMLþ β4,iUMDþ β5,iCMA
þ β6,iRMW þ εi (7)
where Ri and Rm are defined as above, Rf is the risk-free rate expressed by the 1-
month US Treasury bill rate, SMB (Small Minus Big) is the average return on nine
small cap portfolios minus the average return on nine big cap portfolios, HML (high
minus low) is the average return on two value portfolios (in book-to-market equity
terms) minus the average return on two growth portfolios, UMD is the average of
the returns on two (big and small) high prior return portfolios minus the average of
the returns on two low prior return portfolios,2 CMA (Conservative Minus Aggres-
sive) is the average return on two conservative portfolios minus the average return
on two aggressive portfolios and RMW (Robust Minus Weak) is the average return
on two robust operating profitability portfolios minus the average return on 2-weak
operating profitability portfolios.3
In the [42] model, the size effect implies that small cap firms exhibit returns that
are superior to those of large firms. Theoretical explanations for the small size effect
suggest that the stocks of small firms are less liquid and trading in them generates
greater transaction costs; there is also less information available on small companies
and, thus, the monitoring cost of a portfolio with small stocks is generally greater
than the cost of a portfolio of large firms.
The book-to-market equity ratio effect captured by the HML factor implies that
the average returns on stocks with a high book-value to market-value equity ratio
must be greater than the returns on stocks with a low book-value to market-value
equity ratio. The high book-value firms are considered to be underpriced by the
market and, therefore, they constitute appealing buy-and-hold targets, as their
2 Big means that a firm is above the median market cap on the NYSE at the end of the previous day while
small firms are below the median NYSE market cap.
3 The historical daily data of the risk-free rate, the Fama and French three factors, the Carhart
momentum factor, the robust minus weak factor and the conservative minus aggressive factor are
available on the website of Kenneth French (http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/
data_library.html).
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price is expected to rise later. This anomaly undermines the semi-strong form
efficiency of the stock market.
The existence of momentum in asset prices is an anomaly which has not been
explained sufficiently by the finance theory. The difficulty in explaining the
momentum anomaly is that, as the efficient capital markets theory suggests, an
increase in the price of an asset cannot be indicative of a further increase in future
prices. Behavioral finance has offered some possible explanations to the existence of
the momentum anomaly. In particular, investors are assumed to be irrational and,
consequently, they underreact to the release of new information failing to incorpo-
rate new information in the prices of their transactions.
The Conservative Minus Aggressive and Robust Minus Weak factors correspond
to the [44] investment and operating profitability factors. [44] use past investment
as a proxy for the expected future investment and, based on valuation theory, they
suggest that CMA implies a negative relation between the expected investment and
the expected internal rate of return. Furthermore, based on the findings of [44], a
negative loading is expected for the RMW factor, that is, the excess return of IPO
ETFs must be affected by the profitability factor in a negative fashion.
The usage of Eq. (7) aims at capturing the market elements that can affect the
performance of IPO ETFs and considering whether these funds can produce any
meaningful above market returns, which will be represented by a positive and
statistically significant alpha. With respect to the latter, [44] assert that if an asset
pricing model fully captures expected returns, the intercept of the model should be
indistinguishable from zero in a regression of an asset’s excess return on the factor
returns of the model.
The model is successively run for six different time periods. The first period
concerns the first 21 trading days of each ETF excluding the month in which the
ETF began trading on the exchange. We do so as we did when we estimated the
long-run performance of ETFs above to allow for the possibility of price support in
the first few trading days. This month is also excluded from all the other time
intervals over which Eq. (7) is applied.
The second interval assessed concerns the first 63 trading days of each ETF. The
third period examined regards the first 6 months of trading, that is, the first 126
trading days of each fund. The next period taken into consideration covers the first
12 months of trading data. In our analysis, the intervals ranging up to 1 year can be
considered as a short-term investment horizon. Looking for more long run, we run
the model for a period covering the first 18 and the first 24 months of each ETF’s
trading records. Finally, we run Eq. (7) over the entire history of each ETF so as to
define the overall buy-and-hold risk-adjusted performance of ETFs.
3.4 Market trend return analysis
In the last step, we perform a “market trend” analysis of IPO ETF returns by
examining how the return of ETFs responds to the decreasing or increasing swings
of the overall stock market as the latter is alternatively represented by the S&P 500
Index and the S&P 600 Small Cap Index.
In our analysis, we first sort the daily returns of benchmark and then compute
the number and portion of daily returns of each ETF that are negative or equal to
zero and the number and portion of positive ETF daily returns during the
descending path and during the ascending path of the stock market. If ETFs follow
the market closely, they are expected to decline when the market declines and vice
versa. Similarly to the short- and long-term performance analysis in the previous
sections, we use three alternative types of returns, which are the absolute,
benchmark-adjusted and abnormal return.
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4. The sample
The sample of the study includes the four IPO ETFs available in the US capital
market. Table 1 presents the profiles of ETFs. Presented in the table are the ticker,
name of each ETF, name of tracking index, inception date, age in years, expense
ratio, average daily volume in number of traded shares, and the historical tracking
error of ETFs, which is the difference in returns between ETF and benchmark based
on information on historical performance of ETFs before taxes and benchmark
returns from each ETF’s inception up to December 31, 2015. The information on
ETFs’ ticker, name, benchmark, inception date, and expense ratio as well as on the
historical performance of ETFs and underlying indices has been found on the
websites of ETFs’ managing companies.
Moreover, Table 1 reports the trading frequency of ETFs that is calculated as the
fraction of trading days with nonzero volume to the total trading history (in days)
for each fund, the average intraday volatility computed as the percentage fraction of
the highest minus the lowest trade price of each fund on day t to its close trade price
on the same day, and the fraction of each ETF’s intraday volatility to the intraday
volatility of the S&P 500 Index and the S&P 600 Small Cap Index, respectively. The
last ratios help assessing whether IPO ETFs are more volatile than the market or not.
The time series of daily volumes, open, high, low, and close prices of ETFs and the
S&P 500 Index have been found on the website of NASDAQ. The historical data of
the S&P 600 Small Cap Index have been obtained from Yahoo! Finance.
Regarding the underlying assets of ETFs, we note that the first fund tracks the
Renaissance US IPO Index, which reflects approximately the top 80% of newly
public firms based on full market capitalization. The second ETF follows the
Renaissance International IPO Index, which is a portfolio of the top 80% non-US-
listed newly public companies, prior to their inclusion in global core equity portfo-
lios. The third ETF seeks to replicate the return of the IPOX®-100 US Index. This
index measures the performance of the top 100 largest, typically best performing
and most liquid US IPOs during their first 1000 trading days. The last IPO ETF
examined tracks the IPOX International Index, which measures the performance of
the 50 largest and typically most liquid companies domiciled outside the US within
the IPOX Global Composite Index during their first 1000 trading days. All the
indices above are reconstituted and adjusted quarterly and companies that have
been public for 2 years (in the case of the Renaissance indices) or 1000 days (in the
case of the IPOX®-100 US Index and IPOX International Index) are removed.
The average age of ETFs is equal to 4.42 years with the oldest one being the First
Trust US Equity Opportunities ETF, which was launched in April 2006. The rest
funds are 3 years old at a maximum indicating that this niche of the ETF market is
very young but possibly very prosperous. The average expense ratio is modest being
equal to 0.68%. In addition, the ETFs tracking non-US-listed IPOs are more expen-
sive than their domestically allocated peers. This cost superiority of domestic ETFs
is not surprising as it has been observed in the case of the “traditional” ETFs both in
and outside the US.
Moreover, Table 1 shows that an average number of about 16,000 ETF shares
are traded every day with the First Trust US Equity Opportunities ETF being the
more tradable fund in the sample. The concentration of trading to the most aged
fund may be the result of the advantage of this ETF in terms of information
availability relative to the younger funds and may indicate that investors deem this
ETF as more prosperous based on its amassed trading experience.
Going further, the average raw tracking error of the sample is equal to 0.56%.
The negative sign means that the average ETF underperforms its benchmark by 56
basis points (bps). Among the four ETFs in the sample, only one outperforms its
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benchmark by 12 bps. As a comment on tracking error, we should point out that the
literature has accentuated that tracking error is an unavoidable event for ETFs given
that their returns are usually calculated free of expenses and transaction costs while
Ticker Name Benchmark Inception
date
Age Expense ratio
IPO Renaissance IPO ETF Renaissance US
IPO Index
10/14/13 3.049 0.60%
IPOS Renaissance
International IPO
ETF
Renaissance
International IPO
Index
10/6/2014 2.071 0.80%
FPX First Trust US Equity
Opportunities ETF
IPOX®-100 US
Index
4/12/2006 10.562 0.60%
FPXI First Trust
International IPOX
ETF
IPOX International
Index
11/4/2014 1.992 0.70%
Mean 4.418 0.68%
Ticker Name Benchmark Volume Tracking error Trading freq.
IPO Renaissance IPO ETF Renaissance US
IPO Index
13,273 1.12% 99.61%
IPOS Renaissance
International IPO
ETF
Renaissance
International IPO
Index
461 0.12% 55.36%
FPX First Trust US Equity
Opportunities ETF
IPOX®-100 US
Index
37,016 0.68% 98.87%
FPXI First Trust
International IPOX
ETF
IPOX International
Index
14,605 0.56% 78.64%
Mean 16,339 0.56% 83.12%
Ticker Name Benchmark Intraday
volatility
ETF Int. Vol/
S&P 500 Int.
Vol
ETF Int. Vol/
S&P 600 Int.
Vol
IPO Renaissance IPO ETF Renaissance US
IPO Index
1.101 1.232 0.976
IPOS Renaissance
International IPO
ETF
Renaissance
International IPO
Index
0.486 0.568 0.515
FPX First Trust US Equity
Opportunities ETF
IPOX®-100 US
Index
1.098 0.934 0.740
FPXI First Trust
International IPOX
ETF
IPOX International
Index
0.574 0.644 0.527
Mean 0.815 0.844 0.689
This table presents the profiles of IPO ETFs, which include their ticker, name, benchmark, inception date, age as at
October 31, 2016, expense ratio, average daily volume, historical tracking error, i.e., difference in performance
between ETF and its benchmark, since each ETF’s inception up to December 31, 2015, trading frequency calculated
as the fraction of trading days with nonzero volume to the total trading history (in days) for each fund, average
intraday volatility calculated as the percentage fraction of the highest minus the lowest trading price of each fund on
day t to its close price on the same day, and the fraction of each ETF’s intraday volatility to the intraday volatility of
the S&P 500 Index and the S&P 600 Small Cap Index, respectively.
Table 1.
Profiles of ETFs.
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index returns reflect no costs at all. In addition, other factors, such as the different
time schedules between the stock exchanges on which the shares of ETFs and the
underlying securities are traded, especially in the case of ETFs tracking
nondomestic market indices, can hamper the effort of ETFs to efficiently replicate
the performance of their benchmarks.
When it comes to trading frequency, Table 1 reports an average term of 83%.
This percentage indicates that there is a considerable amount of days on which ETFs
present nil trading activity. These findings are in line with the low volumes
discussed above. The next trading feature concerns the intraday volatility of ETFs,
which is equal to 0.815 on average terms. Surprisingly enough, the international IPO
ETFs are less volatile than their domestically allocated peers. This is a new finding as
the relevant ETF literature has provided strong evidence that ETFs tracking inter-
national indices are riskier than those that track indices from the local stock market.
In any case, however, both the average and the individual intraday volatility calcu-
lations are quite low showing that IPO ETFs can be a relatively safe haven for equity
investors when the overall capital market is in turbulence. This claim can be verified
by the ratios of ETFs’ intraday volatility to those of the two Standard and Poor’s
indices taken into consideration. In both cases, the average ratios are below unity,
whereas only one out of eight single ratios is greater than unity indicating that IPO
ETFs are less volatile than the market.
5. Empirical results
5.1 Short-term return analysis
Table 2 presents the estimations of IPO ETFs’ short-term performance. Specifi-
cally, the table reports the three types of initial returns, that is, the first-day abso-
lute, benchmark-adjusted, and abnormal return along with the corresponding
average returns over the first 2, 3, 4, 5, 21, and 63 trading days.
As far as absolute returns are concerned, Table 2 shows that the average initial
return of the sample is positive amounting to 29 bps. This positive mean term
indicates a favorable response to the launch of these alternative investing tools on
behalf of investors. However, it should be noted that, when focusing on the perfor-
mance of individual funds, we can see that the absolute initial return can be either
negative or positive and ranges from 0.35% for the Renaissance International IPO
ETF to 1.45% for the Renaissance IPO ETF.
After the first trading day, the average absolute return of the sample remains
positive up to the first 5 days and becomes negative when the 1- and 3-month
periods are assessed. In addition, after the third day, average absolute return starts
deteriorating. At the fund level, most of the longer-term average returns are
positive for the Renaissance International IPO ETF and the First Trust US Equity
Opportunities ETF, they are steadily negative for the Renaissance International
IPO ETF, while returns are mixed in the case of the First Trust International
IPOX ETF.
When it comes to benchmark-adjusted returns, Table 2 reports a positive aver-
age initial return for the sample, either when the S&P 500 Index or the S&P 600
Small Cap Index is the benchmark into consideration. In addition, when the latter
index is used, the average initial return of the sample is about double the respective
return when the S&P 500 Index is used to compute the benchmark-adjusted returns
of IPO ETFs. At the fund level, only the First Trust International IPOX ETF pro-
duces negative benchmark-adjusted return, whereas the rest of ETFs can beat the
market on their first trading day.
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Furthermore,Table 2 reports mixed results about longer-run benchmark-adjusted
returns. For instance, when the 2-day period is considered and the S&P 500 Index is
used as the benchmark, the returns of three ETFs are negative (two return estimates
in the case of the S&P 600 Small Cap Index). In the case of the 3-day investment
window, returns aremixed. In the case of the 4-day period and the S&P 500 Index, all
the average returns are positive while over longer periods, whatever the benchmark
may be, the majority of benchmark-adjusted returns are negative.
Absolute returns
Period IPO IPOS FPX FPXI Mean
t1 1.446 0.348 0.299 0.250 0.287
t2 0.944 0.184 0.175 0.125 0.202
t3 1.103 0.731 0.398 0.285 0.264
t4 0.714 0.706 0.471 0.213 0.173
t5 0.604 0.614 0.475 0.171 0.159
t21 0.092 0.046 0.072 0.029 0.014
t63 0.163 0.021 0.119 0.111 0.022
Benchmark-adjusted returns
Benchmark: S&P 500 Index Benchmark: S&P 600 Small Cap Index
Period IPO IPOS FPX FPXI Mean IPO IPOS FPX FPXI Mean
t1 0.209 1.041 0.222 0.285 0.297 1.500 0.925 0.056 0.274 0.552
t2 0.012 0.362 0.283 0.299 0.098 0.512 0.492 0.027 0.308 0.065
t3 0.247 0.162 0.099 0.146 0.033 0.409 0.155 0.528 0.154 0.030
t4 0.070 0.008 0.048 0.127 0.063 0.225 0.006 0.483 0.050 0.078
t5 0.026 0.286 0.113 0.091 0.116 0.151 0.005 0.236 0.133 0.011
t21 0.133 0.171 0.085 0.097 0.122 0.054 0.398 0.077 0.001 0.132
t63 0.029 0.058 0.065 0.127 0.055 0.051 0.124 0.009 0.144 0.056
Abnormal returns
Benchmark: S&P 500 Index Benchmark: S&P 600 Small Cap Index
Period IPO IPOS FPX FPXI Mean IPO IPOS FPX FPXI Mean
t1 0.199 0.167 0.194 0.236 0.081 1.495 0.043 0.083 0.236 0.346
t2 0.017 0.252 0.252 0.183 0.050 0.580 0.275 0.028 0.180 0.038
t3 0.244 0.521 0.120 0.244 0.038 0.516 0.553 0.321 0.253 0.026
t4 0.070 0.442 0.025 0.200 0.037 0.302 0.490 0.269 0.125 0.083
t5 0.025 0.281 0.089 0.161 0.014 0.223 0.425 0.086 0.179 0.028
t21 0.126 0.095 0.114 0.032 0.092 0.029 0.150 0.114 0.008 0.071
t63 0.038 0.037 0.096 0.087 0.046 0.071 0.050 0.075 0.101 0.039
This table presents the return of IPO ETFs on their first trading day, i.e., the first day with positive trading volume,
calculated in percentage terms as the fraction of the close trade price minus the opening trade price to the opening trade
price, as well as the average absolute (daily) return over the first 2, 3, 4, 5, 21 (i.e., 1 month), and 63 (i.e., 3 months)
days of each ETF’s trading history. Then, the table presents the benchmark-adjusted returns of ETFs, i.e., ETF return
minus benchmark return, over the same intervals using as alternative benchmarks the S&P 500 Index and the S&P
600 Small Cap Index. Finally, the table presents the abnormal returns of IPO ETFs estimated with the market model.
Table 2.
Short-term return analysis.
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The abnormal returns of ETFs behave similarly to benchmark-adjusted returns.
The average first-day abnormal return of the sample is positive irrespective of the
index incorporated in the market model to estimate abnormal returns. In addition,
the average abnormal return of the sample based on the S&P 600 Small Cap Index
is more than three times the respective average return when the S&P 500 Index is
taken into consideration. Scanning through the single ETF returns, we observe that
three out of four funds deliver significant first-day profits, which range from 17 bps
for the Renaissance International IPO ETF to 20 bps for the Renaissance IPO ETF.
At the longer-run level, abnormal returns mimic the benchmark-adjusted
returns quite closely. For instance, similarly to benchmark-adjusted returns, the
average 2-day abnormal returns based on the S&P 500 Index is negative for three
out of four ETFs (the same ETFs as in the case of benchmark-adjusted perfor-
mance). Returns over other frequencies up to 5 days are either negative or positive
without allowing us to detect any specific pricing trend. However, when it comes to
longer periods reaching one or 3 months, average returns become negative.
The main conclusion that can be reached by the analysis of the various types of
short-term returns is that, on average, significant gains can be realized on the first
trading day of IPO ETFs. However, gains diminish or even vanish when longer
periods, such as 1 month or 3 months of trading, are assessed. Based on these
findings, we could claim that IPO ETFs may be suitable for day traders but not for
investors with a short-term horizon, which does not exceed 3 months.
5.2 Long-term return analysis
The long-run performance of ETFs is assessed in this section. The relevant
estimations of cumulative and buy-and-hold returns over a 6-month, 12-month, 18-
month, and 24-month period are presented in Table 3 along with the corresponding
returns over the entire trading history of ETFs. Cumulative returns are presented
from an absolute, benchmark-adjusted, and abnormal perspective. On the other
hand, buy-and-hold returns are reported in their absolute and benchmark-adjusted
form.
We note that, as shown in Table 1, the Renaissance International IPO ETF is
about 2 years old. This means that the total trading history of this fund coincides
with the 24-month subperiod considered in our analysis. Moreover, the trading
history of the First Trust International IPOX ETF is less than 2 years and, thus, we
cannot compute returns over a 24-month period for this fund.
When it comes to cumulative absolute returns, the results in Table 3 indicate
that IPO ETFs can produce positive such returns. In particular, the average return
over the first 6 months of trading approximates 30 bps. Average returns are also
positive for the rest intervals considered as well as over the entire trading history of
ETFs. In addition, except for the First Trust International IPOX ETF, the funds of
the sample provide positive cumulative returns over the several time periods
assessed. The First Trust International IPOX ETF presents a positive cumulative
absolute return only over the first 6 months of trading.
When the cumulative benchmark-adjusted returns are considered, Table 3
reports mixed results. For example, the average historical return (i.e., over the total
trading history up to October 31, 2016) of the sample is positive when the S&P 500
Index is taken into consideration, but it becomes negative when the S&P 600 Small
Cap Index is the reference portfolio. Moreover, three (two) out of four funds
underperform the S&P 500 Index (the S&P 600 Small Cap Index).
In the case of cumulative abnormal returns, the results in Table 3 indicate that
the average IPO ETF underperforms the S&P 500 Index, but it performs better than
the S&P 600 Small Cap Index up to 24 trading months. However, the average IPO
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Cumulative absolute returns
Period IPO IPOS FPX FPXI Mean
6 months 0.292 0.564 0.186 0.143 0.296
12 months 0.621 0.147 0.707 0.541 0.233
18 months 0.927 0.021 1.168 0.741 0.333
24 months 0.404 0.007 1.009 N/A 0.474
Total period 0.219 0.007 5.718 0.478 1.366
Cumulative benchmark-adjusted returns
Benchmark: S&P 500 Index Benchmark: S&P 600 Small Cap Index
Period IPO IPOS FPX FPXI Mean IPO IPOS FPX FPXI Mean
6 months 0.058 0.380 0.106 0.027 0.061 0.105 0.387 0.134 0.159 0.117
12 months 0.018 0.105 0.081 0.626 0.167 0.281 0.067 0.315 0.808 0.070
18 months 0.008 0.182 0.338 0.899 0.188 0.278 0.170 0.678 1.073 0.072
24 months 0.486 0.337 0.625 N/A 0.066 0.141 0.406 1.012 N/A 0.155
Total period 0.824 0.337 2.350 0.712 0.119 0.623 0.406 1.287 0.925 0.167
Cumulative abnormal returns
Benchmark: S&P 500 Index Benchmark: S&P 600 Small Cap Index
Period IPO IPOS FPX FPXI Mean IPO IPOS FPX FPXI Mean
6 months 0.004 0.483 0.278 0.276 0.121 0.151 0.528 0.078 0.157 0.189
12 months 0.107 0.029 0.262 0.199 0.081 0.369 0.117 0.034 0.368 0.021
18 months 0.180 0.117 0.178 0.244 0.090 0.430 0.013 0.128 0.452 0.024
24 months 0.229 0.170 0.074 N/A 0.158 0.014 0.048 0.106 N/A 0.024
Total period 0.434 0.170 1.301 0.141 0.441 0.388 0.048 2.297 0.119 0.713
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Buy-and-hold absolute returns
Period IPO IPOS FPX FPXI Mean
6 months 5.468 12.174 3.261 2.549 5.863
12 months 13.251 0.040 14.773 11.786 4.070
18 months 17.409 4.058 25.445 15.965 5.708
24 months 7.241 4.078 19.417 N/A 7.527
Total period 0.246 4.078 158.585 11.786 35.619
Buy-and-hold benchmark-adjusted returns
Benchmark: S&P 500 Index Benchmark: S&P 600 Small Cap Index
Period IPO IPOS FPX FPXI Mean IPO IPOS FPX FPXI Mean
6 months 7.294 3.539 5.987 2.033 4.713 3.428 3.211 0.213 5.966 3.204
12 months 14.888 4.262 13.405 0.621 8.294 7.982 3.313 7.147 4.422 5.716
18 months 18.953 1.639 17.577 1.537 9.926 11.450 1.004 8.434 4.919 6.452
24 months 19.784 5.357 5.721 N/A 10.287 11.559 6.341 3.974 N/A 4.642
Total period 21.042 5.357 62.226 2.834 22.865 14.830 6.341 83.129 6.763 27.766
This table presents the cumulative absolute returns of IPO ETFs over the first 6, 12, 18, and 24 months of their trading history as well as over their entire trading history up to October 31, 2016. Cumulative
benchmark-adjusted and cumulative abnormal returns relative to the S&P 500 Index and the S&P 600 Small Cap Index, respectively, are presented too. Finally, the table presents the buy-and-hold absolute
and benchmark-adjusted returns of ETFs over the several periods considered.
Table 3.
Long-term return analysis.
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ETF as well as the individual funds fails to derive positive abnormal returns over
their entire trading history irrespective of the market index used to estimate abnor-
mal returns. At the fund level, three and two ETFs provide investors with a positive
cumulative abnormal return against the S&P 500 Index over the 6- and 12-month
period, respectively, but returns are basically negative over the rest time intervals
examined. In the case, of the S&P 600 Small Cap Index, only one ETF can produce
consistent cumulative abnormal returns over a 24-month investment horizon.
After discussing cumulative returns, we focus on the buy-and-hold returns of
IPO ETFs. One element revealed in Table 3 is that the average ETF derives signif-
icant buy-and-hold absolute returns, which range from 4.07% over the 12-month
period to 35.62% over the entire trading history examined. Moreover, all the indi-
vidual ETFs present positive buy-and-hold absolute returns over the first 6-month
trading period, three funds offer positive returns during the first year of their
trading, and two ETFs achieve positive returns during the 18- and 24-month
periods. However, when the entire trading history of ETFs is considered, just the
First Trust US Equity Opportunities ETF provides a significant positive buy-and-
hold absolute return, which approximates 159%.4
On the question of how the buy-and-hold benchmark-adjusted returns of ETFs
behave, Table 3 reports significant such returns over the several intervals investi-
gated. With only one exception, all the return estimates of each single ETF are
positive. Moreover, the average IPO ETF produces a mean buy-and-hold
benchmark-adjusted of 23 and 28% against the S&P 500 Index and S&P 600 Small
Cap Index, respectively, over the whole trading history of ETFs up to October 31,
2016. At the fund level, the First Trust US Equity Opportunities ETF is the most
profitable ETF in the sample. The historical buy-and-hold benchmark-adjusted
return of this fund amounts to 62 and 83% in the case of the S&P 500 Index and the
S&P 600 Small Cap Index, respectively.5
Overall, the analysis of long-run performance reveals that IPO ETFs can be
suitable investment choices for investors looking for substantial long-term profits
from entering the IPO business. More importantly, the findings on buy-and-hold
benchmark-adjusted returns indicate that IPO ETFs can beat the overall stock mar-
ket over shorter or longer periods. This pattern should be highly welcome by inves-
tors who always seek for alternative investment tools to perform above the market.
4 The rest ETFs present significantly negative buy-and-hold absolute returns. However, the magnitude
of the positive return of the First Trust US Equity Opportunities ETF is that big so that the average
historical buy-and-hold absolute return of the sample be equal to 36%.
5 A comment that can be made with respect to the First Trust US Equity Opportunities ETF significantly
outperforming its peers (in the case of the S&P 500 Index, the mean benchmark-adjusted
outperformance of this fund over other ETFs in the sample is equal to 45.81% whereas, in the case of the
S&P 600 Small Cap Index, average outperformance approximates 67%), concerns the age of this ETF. In
particular, as we have seen in the previous sections, this ETF was the pioneer in the IPO ETF business
and has more than 10 years of trading records. The performance superiority of the oldest fund in the
sample over its younger peers from a buy-and-hold benchmark-adjusted perspective resembles the long-
run performance advantage of the companies going public after several years of operation as private
non-listed firms. The findings of several studies such as those of [23, 45–47] provide strong evidence of a
positive relationship between a firm’s age and its long-run performance. Obviously, an ETF has no
operating history before its inception on a stock exchange. That said, after inception, the trading
experience accumulated to an ETF seems to be a decisive factor that can affect its performance. In our
study, the very small size of the sample (just four funds) does not allow running a cross-sectional
regression of ETFs’ long-run performance on their age to obtain statistical support of our assertion about
the return of aged ETFs against their young counterparts.
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5.3 Risk-adjusted performance analysis
The results of the six-factor regression model are provided inTable 4. The table
includes the alpha coefficient along with the estimates of the explanatory variables of
the model. Probabilities on the statistical significance of estimates are provided too
alongwith R-squared on the sufficiency of themodel to explain the performance of IPO
ETFs. Finally, the results are presented for each ETF over the several estimation win-
dows considered and against the two differentmarket indices employed in our analysis.
When it comes to excess performance, Table 4 shows that most of the average
alpha estimates over the several subperiods examined are positive either when the
S&P 500 Index is the benchmark in the model or the S&P 600 Small Cap Index is
used as a proxy for the market return. However, at the fund level, most of the
individual alphas are insignificant both in statistical and economic terms. Based on
this element, we conclude that IPO ETFs fail to deliver any above market return.
However, this conclusion does not apply to the First Trust US Equity Opportunities
ETF. Over the 6-month estimation window or longer, the alpha estimates of this fund
are positive and statistically significant at the 10% or better indicating that this ETF
can beat the market. We remind that this ETF is the oldest among the funds in the
sample. Thus, the assertion about the positive relationship between the age of IPO
ETFs and their long-run performance is verified by the results of regression analysis.
With respect to systematic risk, the beta estimates presented in Table 4 are all
positive with the majority of them being significant at the 5% or better. Moreover, a
wide fluctuation in betas is observed among the various subperiods examined.
However, in each single period as well as over the entire trading history of each
ETF, there is a convergence in betas obtained from using the two alternative market
benchmarks. At the sample level, the average beta coefficients are below unity
indicating that IPO ETFs are more conservative than the market. Conservativeness
implies that investors choosing IPO ETFs are relatively protected during declining
paths of the overall stock market. This finding is in line with the ratios of ETFs’
intraday volatility to that of benchmarks in Table 1, where we saw that ETFs are
less volatile than the market indices. Therefore, our assertion about IPO ETFs
standing as a relative safe haven for equity investors during turbulent markets is
verified by the estimations of systematic risk via regression analysis.
Going further, when the S&P 500 Index represents the stock market in the
model, the effect of the size factor on the performance of ETFs seems to be signif-
icant only in the case of the Renaissance IPO ETF and the First Trust US Equity
Opportunities ETF. For these funds, the coefficients of the SMB factor are con-
stantly positive, while most of them are significant at the 10% or better. The
positive and significant effect of the size factor on the performance of at least two
ETFs in the sample is in line with our expectations given that, according to Fama
and French (2015), the SMB slopes are strongly positive for small stocks (and
slightly negative for big stocks), and that the ETFs examined are indeed small cap or
even very small cap.6 When the S&P 600 Small Cap Index is used as the market
6 Based on the definition of “small capitalization” offered by Investopedia, a small cap firm is a company
with a capitalization of between $300 million and $2 billion (http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/sma
ll-cap.asp). As of 5 January, 2017, the ETFs in our sample have a minimum of Net Assets of $1.9 million
in the case of the Renaissance International IPO ETF and a maximum of assets of $633.6 million in the
case of the First Trust US Equity Opportunities ETF (according to information found on the website of
ETFs’ managing companies). Based on these figures, it is obvious that the ETFs in the sample stand as
small cap portfolios and, consequently, the positive sign of the SMB estimates for at least two funds is a
reasonable finding.
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Benchmark: S&P 500 Index
1 month Alpha Beta SMB HML UMD CMA RMW R2
IPO 0.090 1.085a 0.002 0.671 0.260 2.190a 0.441 0.850
IPOS 0.153 0.304 0.589 1.828 0.474 0.366 0.385 0.206
FPX 0.153 0.639a 0.095a 1.025b 0.415c 0.440 0.307 0.795
FPXI 0.117 1.184a 0.100 0.157 0.006 0.334 0.709 0.608
Mean 0.025 0.803 0.098 0.920 0.052 0.833 0.268 0.615
3 months Alpha Beta SMB HML UMD CMA RMW R2
IPO 0.087 0.799a 0.095 0.116 0.464a 1.600a 0.139a 0.688
IPOS 0.029 0.436a 0.230 0.609 0.066 0.154 0.050 0.184
FPX 0.042 0.879a 0.222 0.130 0.377a 0.093 0.696a 0.878
FPXI 0.148c 0.200 0.174 0.253 0.120 0.284 0.105 0.082
Mean 0.002 0.579 0.093 0.277 0.164 0.314 0.195 0.458
6 months Alpha Beta SMB HML UMD CMA RMW R2
IPO 0.044 0.755a 0.209c 0.155 0.487a 0.613b 0.445b 0.813
IPOS 0.084 0.291a 0.064 0.105 0.074 0.050 0.214 0.132
FPX 0.087a 0.949a 0.472a 0.155 0.168b 0.538a 0.621a 0.870
FPXI 0.040 0.287b 0.097 0.389 0.162 0.138 0.234 0.039
Mean 0.044 0.570 0.211 0.201 0.105 0.335 0.262 0.463
12 months Alpha Beta SMB HML UMD CMA RMW R2
IPO 0.003 0.831a 0.117 0.278b 0.205b 0.874a 0.749a 0.808
IPOS 0.042 0.405a 0.000 0.516b 0.160 0.485 0.235 0.065
FPX 0.047b 0.902a 0.436a 0.175 0.207a 0.367a 0.502a 0.862
FPXI 0.048 0.403a 0.063 0.538a 0.240a 0.441c 0.174 0.164
Mean 0.011 0.635 0.122 0.377 0.003 0.078 0.328 0.475
18 months Alpha Beta SMB HML UMD CMA RMW R2
IPO 0.001 0.869a 0.215a 0.185c 0.042 1.008a 0.547a 0.738
IPOS 0.021 0.330a 0.096 0.225 0.107 0.073 0.477b 0.064
FPX 0.037c 0.908a 0.490a 0.047 0.224a 0.293a 0.423a 0.850
FPXI 0.066 0.406a 0.039 0.159 0.144 0.061 0.028 0.202
Mean 0.002 0.628 0.143 0.154 0.004 0.359 0.369 0.464
24 months Alpha Beta SMB HML UMD CMA RMW R2
IPO 0.017 0.893a 0.364a 0.307a 0.101b 0.576a 0.486a 0.742
IPOS 0.003 0.309a 0.023 0.129 0.118c 0.128 0.409b 0.070
FPX 0.037c 0.949a 0.402a 0.124c 0.188a 0.480a 0.516a 0.830
FPXI N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Mean 0.005 0.717 0.248 0.187 0.010 0.395 0.470 0.547
Total period Alpha Beta SMB HML UMD CMA RMW R2
IPO 0.017 0.900a 0.443a 0.150b 0.121a 0.596a 0.440a 0.728
IPOS 0.003 0.309a 0.023 0.129 0.118c 0.128 0.409b 0.070
FPX 0.021a 0.962a 0.279a 0.179a 0.053a 0.346a 0.245a 0.698
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Benchmark: S&P 500 Index
24 months Alpha Beta SMB HML UMD CMA RMW R2
FPXI 0.031 0.507a 0.020 0.098 0.132b 0.105 0.158 0.267
Mean 0.008 0.669 0.180 0.139 0.080 0.241 0.313 0.441
Benchmark: S&P 600 Small Cap Index
1 month Alpha Beta SMB HML UMD CMA RMW R2
IPO 0.022 1.003a 0.918a 0.521 0.246 2.693a 0.512 0.791
IPOS 0.195 0.270 0.753 1.596 0.343 0.185 0.350 0.205
FPX 0.125a 0.631a 0.335 0.910b 0.423 0.019 0.400 0.722
FPXI 0.096a 0.862b 0.868c 0.410 0.078 0.519 0.364 0.559
Mean 0.050 0.691 0.718 0.859 0.062 0.845 0.232 0.569
3 months Alpha Beta SMB HML UMD CMA RMW R2
IPO 0.078 0.893a 0.822b 0.393 0.351 1.309a 0.603 0.694
IPOS 0.010 0.441a 0.322c 0.834b 0.076 0.361 0.301 0.207
FPX 0.025 0.783a 0.434b 0.021 0.360a 0.157 0.860a 0.875
FPXI 0.154b 0.215b 0.413b 0.310 0.111 0.330 0.052 0.088
Mean 0.010 0.583 0.498 0.389 0.131 0.194 0.428 0.466
6 months Alpha Beta SMB HML UMD CMA RMW R2
IPO 0.042 0.749a 0.610a 0.324 0.534a 0.550c 0.534b 0.816
IPOS 0.084 0.284a 0.229 0.143 0.069 0.073 0.279 0.131
FPX 0.058a 0.845a 0.323b 0.181 0.288a 0.235 0.613a 0.861
FPXI 0.047 0.272b 0.162 0.396 0.158 0.173 0.205 0.037
Mean 0.034 0.537 0.331 0.261 0.149 0.258 0.305 0.461
12 months Alpha Beta SMB HML UMD CMA RMW R2
IPO 0.004 0.782a 0.706a 0.463a 0.249a 0.798a 0.869a 0.797
IPOS 0.033 0.416a 0.421a 0.626b 0.187c 0.518 0.280 0.068
FPX 0.047a 0.857a 0.394a 0.226c 0.269a 0.250b 0.584a 0.850
FPXI 0.071 0.382a 0.285b 0.547a 0.234a 0.042 0.282 0.169
Mean 0.003 0.609 0.451 0.465 0.025 0.122 0.363 0.471
18 months Alpha Beta SMB HML UMD CMA RMW R2
IPO 0.002 0.827a 0.649a 0.359a 0.041 0.944a 0.720a 0.731
IPOS 0.015 0.331a 0.433a 0.301 0.132b 0.046 0.520a 0.065
FPX 0.031 0.877a 0.383a 0.092 0.259a 0.219a 0.463a 0.833
FPXI 0.077 0.404a 0.447a 0.248b 0.187a 0.067 0.087 0.206
Mean 0.007 0.610 0.478 0.250 0.005 0.319 0.448 0.459
24 months Alpha Beta SMB HML UMD CMA RMW R2
IPO 0.020 0.859a 0.521a 0.504a 0.170a 0.572a 0.641a 0.729
IPOS 0.007 0.304a 0.331a 0.200 0.147b 0.112 0.454a 0.069
FPX 0.031 0.919a 0.505a 0.184b 0.192a 0.414a 0.543a 0.816
FPXI N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Mean 0.002 0.694 0.453 0.296 0.042 0.366 0.546 0.538
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portfolio, the results about the SMB factor are opposite to those just discussed. All
the individual estimates are negative with the majority of them being statistically
significant. This pattern was not expected but it could possibly be considered by the
correlation of the SMB factor with the S&P 600 Small Cap Index.7 This means that
the effect of the size factor may be expressed by the positive slope of the market
index.8
On the impact of the value factor on performance of IPO ETFs, the relevant
estimates of the HML variable are all negative with most of them being statistically
significant at the 10% or better, especially when the 12-month or longer estimation
windows are considered. This finding applies to both versions of the model, namely
either when the S&P 500 Index or the S&P 600 Small Cap Index is used. Based on
Fama and French [44], the strongly negative slope of the HML factor indicates that
IPO ETFs may be deemed as to resemble low B/M (i.e., book-to-market) growth
stock portfolios. This is true given that the stocks that comprise the underlying
indices of IPO ETFs are usually small cap companies that go public with strong
perceived potential for significant growth in the future.
The next variable considered is the momentum factor of Carhart. The majority
of the relevant sample average estimates are positive, especially in the short-run,
namely over periods up to 12 months. In the long run, the average momentum
coefficients are negative. A negative sample average is obtained when the entire
trading history of each ETFs is taken into consideration when running the perfor-
mance regression model. At the fund level, when the first version of the model is
assessed (i.e., the one with the S&P 500 Index), about half of the momentum
Benchmark: S&P 600 Small Cap Index
24 month Alpha Beta SMB HML UMD CMA RMW R2
Total period Alpha Beta SMB HML UMD CMA RMW R2
IPO 0.019 0.853a 0.431a 0.335a 0.203a 0.591a 0.606a 0.714
IPOS 0.007 0.304a 0.331a 0.200 0.147b 0.112 0.454b 0.069
FPX 0.023a 0.912a 0.630a 0.301a 0.013 0.352a 0.372a 0.681
FPXI 0.037 0.497a 0.484a 0.219c 0.184a 0.132 0.240 0.272
Mean 0.002 0.694 0.453 0.296 0.042 0.366 0.546 0.538
This table presents the results of a six-factor performance regression model. The daily excess return of IPO ETFs is
successively regressed on the excess return of the S&P 500 Index or the S&P 600 Small Cap Index, and the
Fama&French SMB (small minus big) factor, the Fama&French HML (high minus low book-to-price ratio) factor,
the Carhart UMD (momentum) factor, the Fama&French CMA (conservative minus aggressive) factor, and the
Fama&French RMW (robust minus weak) factor. The model is run over the first month, 3 months, 6 months,
12 months, 18 months, and 24 months of each ETF’s trading history excluding the month of each ETF’s launch on the
stock exchange. The model is also run over the entire trading history of each ETF up to October 31, 2016 also excluding
the month of each ETF’s launch on the stock exchange.
aindicates statistical significance at 1% level.
bindicates statistical significance at 5% level.
cindicates statistical significance at 10% level.
Table 4.
Risk-adjusted performance analysis.
7 We have computed an average correlation between the SMB and the S&P 600 Small Cap Index of 0.55
over the various time intervals that correspond to the trading history of each ETFs under examination.
8 To verify that the results reported with the usage of the S&P 600 Small Cap Index are not spurious, we
run performance regressions after detracting the SMB variable from the model. The results obtained do
not differ significantly from those reported in Table 4.
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estimates up to the 18-month investment window are positive and statistically
significant. After this period, only the First Trust US Equity Opportunities ETF
presents a stable positive relationship with the momentum factor, whereas the rest
three ETFs are negatively related to this factor. This is also the case when the S&P
600 Small Cap Index is the reference market portfolio in the model. The main
conclusion reached though analyzing the results about the momentum factor is that
IPO ETFs follow the trends of the overall stock market in the short-run, but in the
long-run, the pricing behavior of that products can deviate from the market.
When it comes to the Conservative Minus Aggressive factor, the results indicate
a rather negative impact on IPO ETF performance. The majority of CMA estimates
are negative when the S&P 500 Index is the market portfolio in the model. More-
over, 12 out 27 single CMA estimates are statistically significant. More or less, the
same results are obtained when we use the S&P 600 Small Cap Index in regressions.
The negative sign of the CMA variable is in accordance with our expectations for a
negative relationship between the performance of IPO ETFs and the CMA factor
based on the suggestions of Fama and French [44] about a negative relationship
between expected investment and expected rate of return.
Finally, as far as the impact of Robust MinusWeak factor on performance of IPO
ETFs is concerned, the results in Table 4 reveal a negative such effect. In both
versions of the model, the majority of the relevant RMW estimates are negative and
statistically significant (15 and 14 out of 27 individual estimates in the case of the
S&P 500 Index and the S&P 600 Small Cap Index, respectively). This finding is in
accordance with our expectations about a negative relationship between the per-
formance of ETFs and RMW. According to Fama and French [44], the combination
of negative CMA and RMW slopes in the performance regression model (as is the
case in our analysis) indicates that the returns of IPO ETFs resemble the returns of
those firms that invest a lot despite their low profitability.
5.4 Market trend return analysis
The outcomes of the market trend return analysis are provided in Table 5. The
results are presented for absolute, benchmark-adjusted and abnormal returns over
the descending and ascending paths of the S&P 500 Index and the S&P 600 Small
Cap Index, respectively. For each single ETF and over each market path, the num-
ber and percentage of days with negative (or zero) and positive returns are
displayed along with the corresponding average negative and positive returns.
To begin with, when the S&P 500 Index declines, the average IPO ETFs declines
too on 75.31% of the corresponding trading days. The average absolute return on
these negative days amounts to 86 bps. During the negative days of the S&P 500
Index, ETFs present an average positive absolute return on 24.69% of negative
trading days. When the market goes up, IPO ETFs move upward too on 62.08% of
the respective positive days delivering an average return of 102 bps. Moreover,
during the positive path of the S&P 500 Index, ETFs move opposite to the market
on 37.92% of days. When we use the S&P 600 Small Cap Index as a proxy for the
stock market return, we obtain similar results.
The main conclusion that can be drawn from the discussion of absolute returns
is that IPO ETFs are quite but not absolutely aligned to the overall stock market. The
fact that when the market moves downward, IPO ETFs have more than 20%
probability of moving against the market indicates that IPO ETFs can possibly be
useful hedging tools during turbulent stock markets. However, the significant
number of negative return days (i.e., 37.92%) when the stock market moves
upward should be borne in mind when planning investment strategies with IPO
ETFs.
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Taking the analysis a little further, the results on the benchmark-adjusted
returns are very interesting. More specifically, during the negative days of the stock
market, the benchmark-adjusted returns decline too but only on 36.51% (28.26%)
of the respective trading days in the case of the S&P 500 Index (S&P 600 Small Cap
Index). The opposite trend is presented when the market ascends, namely the
benchmark-adjusted ETF returns decline by a rate of 61.32% (or 68.19%) trading
days depending on the index used to represent the stock market. The outcomes
obtained on benchmark-adjusted returns verify that IPO ETFs can be used as
hedging tools over the negative paths of the stock market; however, hedging effi-
ciency is in question when equity prices increase.
When it comes to abnormal returns, we can in see in Table 5 that they behave
qualitatively equal to benchmark-adjusted returns. In particular, they move against
the negative markets on 58.86% of the corresponding negative trading days,
whereas when the pricing in the market are positive, IPO ETFs have a 57.08%
Absolute returns
Descending S&P 500 Index
No of neg. % of neg. Average No of pos. % of pos. Average
IPO 260 71.04% 1.103 106 28.96% 0.426
IPOS 202 77.69% 0.564 58 22.31% 0.855
FPX 958 78.52% 1.103 262 21.48% 0.451
FPXI 185 74.00% 0.685 65 26.00% 0.570
Mean 401 75.31% 0.864 123 24.69% 0.576
Ascending S&P 500 Index
IPO No of neg. % of neg. Average No of pos. % of pos. Average
IPOS 87 21.70% 0.419 314 78.30% 0.905
FPX 165 62.98% 0.352 97 37.02% 1.259
FPXI 253 17.61% 0.421 1184 82.39% 0.985
Mean 124 49.40% 0.297 127 50.60% 0.934
157 37.92% 0.372 431 62.08% 1.021
Descending S&P 600 Small Cap Index descending
No of neg. % of neg. Average No of pos. % of pos. Average
IPO 273 75.62% 1.081 88 24.38% 0.386
IPOS 196 79.67% 0.568 50 20.33% 0.903
FPX 985 78.24% 1.089 274 21.76% 0.436
FPXI 177 74.68% 0.680 60 25.32% 0.573
Mean 408 77.05% 0.855 118 22.95% 0.575
Ascending S&P 600 Small Cap Index
No of neg. % of neg. Average No of pos. % of pos. Average
IPO 74 18.23% 0.381 332 81.77% 0.889
IPOS 171 61.96% 0.355 105 38.04% 1.206
FPX 226 16.17% 0.401 1172 83.83% 0.994
FPXI 132 50.00% 0.327 132 50.00% 0.919
Mean 151 36.59% 0.366 435 63.41% 1.002
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Benchmark-adjusted returns
No of neg. % of neg. Average No of pos. % of pos. Average
IPO 182 49.73% 0.643 184 50.27% 0.517
IPOS 51 19.62% 1.218 209 80.38% 0.794
FPX 555 45.49% 0.448 665 54.51% 0.566
FPXI 78 31.20% 0.628 172 68.80% 0.693
Mean 217 36.51% 0.734 308 63.49% 0.643
Ascending S&P 500 Index
No of neg. % of neg. Average No of pos. % of pos. Average
IPO 199 49.63% 0.509 202 50.37% 0.515
IPOS 211 80.53% 0.895 51 19.47% 1.461
FPX 681 47.39% 0.566 756 52.61% 0.405
FPXI 170 67.73% 0.789 81 32.27% 0.601
Mean 315 61.32% 0.690 273 38.68% 0.745
Descending S&P 600 Small Cap Index descending
No of neg. % of neg. Average No of pos. % of pos. Average
IPO 154 42.66% 0.564 207 57.34% 0.547
IPOS 43 17.48% 1.260 203 82.52% 0.944
FPX 390 30.98% 0.477 869 69.02% 0.723
FPXI 52 21.94% 0.681 185 78.06% 0.789
Mean 160 28.26% 0.745 366 71.74% 0.751
Ascending S&P 600 Small Cap Index
No of neg. % of neg. Average No of pos. % of pos. Average
IPO 220 54.19% 0.575 186 45.81% 0.466
IPOS 217 78.62% 1.054 59 21.38% 1.256
FPX 908 64.95% 0.706 490 35.05% 0.458
FPXI 198 75.00% 0.865 66 25.00% 0.661
Mean 386 68.19% 0.800 200 31.81% 0.711
Abnormal returns
Descending S&P 500 Index
No of neg. % of neg. Average No of pos. % of pos. Average
IPO 177 48.36% 0.638 189 51.64% 0.523
IPOS 73 28.08% 1.227 187 71.92% 0.467
FPX 592 48.52% 0.462 628 51.48% 0.557
FPXI 99 39.60% 0.759 151 60.40% 0.509
Mean 235 41.14% 0.771 289 58.86% 0.514
Ascending S&P 500 Index
No of neg. % of neg. Average No of pos. % of pos. Average
IPO 199 49.63% 0.509 202 50.37% 0.516
IPOS 191 72.90% 0.529 71 27.10% 1.382
FPX 713 49.62% 0.555 724 50.38% 0.405
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probability to present a negative abnormal return. Overall, the analysis of abnormal
returns leads to conclusions similar to these reached through analyzing the
benchmark-adjusted returns, namely IPO ETFs can be useful defending investment
tools during bear markets, but their usefulness may be weakened during bull stock
markets.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we examine the performance of the four IPO ETFs traded on the
US stock market, which invest in equity indices comprised of companies that have
recently gone public. We assess the short- and long-term performance of these
funds by estimating their absolute, benchmark-adjusted and abnormal returns. The
benchmark-adjusted and abnormal returns are computed against the S&P 500
Index and the S&P 600 Small Cap Index.
In the short-run, we first compute the first-trading-day return of ETFs and then
the average daily returns over the first 2, 3, 4, 5, 21, and 63 trading days. At the
long-run level, we calculate cumulative absolute, benchmark-adjusted and abnor-
mal returns over 6-, 12-, 18-, and 24-month investment horizons as well as over the
Abnormal returns
Ascending S&P 500 Index
No of neg. % of neg. Average No of pos. % of pos. Average
FPXI 141 56.18% 0.543 110 43.82% 0.721
Mean 311 57.08% 0.534 277 42.92% 0.756
Descending S&P 600 Small Cap Index descending
No of neg. % of neg. Average No of pos. % of pos. Average
IPO 175 48.48% 0.619 186 51.52% 0.497
IPOS 73 29.67% 1.211 173 70.33% 0.491
FPX 607 48.21% 0.562 652 51.79% 0.566
FPXI 90 37.97% 0.790 147 62.03% 0.509
Mean 236 41.08% 0.795 290 58.92% 0.516
Ascending S&P 600 Small Cap Index
No of neg. % of neg. Average No of pos. % of pos. Average
IPO 197 48.52% 0.500 209 51.48% 0.508
IPOS 192 69.57% 0.546 84 30.43% 1.243
FPX 725 51.86% 0.560 673 48.14% 0.493
FPXI 152 57.58% 0.551 112 42.42% 0.715
Mean 317 56.88% 0.539 270 43.12% 0.740
This table presents a trend analysis of IPO ETF returns, which considers whether the overall stock market, successively
represented by the S&P 500 Index and the S&P 600 Small Cap Index, moves upward or downward. The types of
returns considered are the absolute, benchmark-adjusted returns and abnormal return of ETFs and displayed in the
table are the number and percentage of days presenting negative and positive returns over the descending and the
upward cycle of the stock market as well as the corresponding average returns of ETFs.
Table 5.
Market trend return analysis.
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whole trading history of each single ETF up to October 31, 2016. The same intervals
are used to compute relevant buy-and-hold returns.
Apart from computing short- and long-run returns, we use a six-factor regres-
sion model to assess the relation of ETFs’ performance with certain variables, which
include the market portfolio, the Fama & French size, value, investment and prof-
itability factors and the momentum factor of Carhart. Our study concludes with a
market trend analysis, which assesses the behavior of IPO ETFs during the
descending and upward phases of the overall stock market.
The results obtained are very comprehensive. At first, the analysis shows that
the first-day return of ETFs is positive on average terms and, consequently, signif-
icant profits can be made on the first trading day of IPO ETFs. Going further, short-
term analysis shows that average daily returns weaken after the first trading day
and over a period ranging up to 63 trading days after the launch of each ETF on the
stock exchange. These findings lead to the conclusion that day traders would be
possibly attracted by IPO ETFs, but investors with a short-term investment horizon
not exceeding a quarter should probably avoid IPO ETFs as short-term profits from
such investments would be in question.
When it comes to long-term performance, positive cumulative absolute returns
are computed for the majority of ETFs over the various periods examined. How-
ever, when cumulative benchmark-adjusted and abnormal returns are assessed,
returns are positive only over the first 6 months of trading whereas returns become
negative over the next time periods under study. When we consider the long-run
buy-and-hold returns, our analysis reveals that ETFs deliver such substantial
returns, either in their absolute or benchmark-adjusted form. In other words, from
a buy-and-hold perspective, IPO ETFs can beat the market as it is represented by
S&P 500 Index or the S&P 600 Small Cap Index. In summary, the analysis of long-
run performance shows that investors looking for significant profits in the long run
from entering the IPO business can resort to IPO ETFs to do so.
Regarding risk-adjusted performance, the regression analysis demonstrates that
only one IPO ETF can deliver robust above market performance. The specific ETF
was the first to enter the IPO ETF business, and it is about 8 years older than the
other funds in the sample. This element provides a hint about a positive relation
between age and long-run performance of ETFs. Moreover, regression results reveal
that IPO ETFs are more conservative than the market. This assertion is verified by
the systematic risk of ETFs which is, on average, significantly lower than unity.
Furthermore, a positive effect of the size factor on ETF performance is revealed. On
the contrary, a negative relation is revealed between ETF performance and the
value factor of Fama & French. When it comes to momentum, results indicate that
IPO ETFs are aligned with the stock market in the short-run but they deviate from it
in the long term. Going further, the results concerning the Conservative Minus
Aggressive factor verify a negative relation between investment and expected rate
of return. Finally, as far as the Robust Minus Weak factor is concerned, the results
reveal a negative relationship between the performance of ETFs and RMW, which
combined with the CMA slopes indicates that the returns of IPO ETFs resemble the
returns of those firms with low profitability which nevertheless invest a lot.
In the last step, the market trend return analysis shows that when the stock
market descends, the absolute return of IPO ETFs declines too on about 76% of
negative trading days. On the other hand, when the market moves upward, the
prices of ETFs increase on 63% of the corresponding days. The opposite behavior is
displayed by the benchmark-adjusted and abnormal return of ETFs. This means
that when the market goes down, the ETF benchmark-adjusted and abnormal
returns move to the opposite direction with a probability of 57% or more
(depending on the type of return considered and the index used as the market
25
IPO ETFs: An Alternative Way to Enter the Initial Public Offering Business
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.90269
portfolio). The main conclusion drawn from the market trend analysis is that IPO
ETFs can be useful hedging investment tools during bear markets, but their hedging
efficiency weakens during bull markets.
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